



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

problem—by some one with the ingenuity to perfect a sufficiently refined experimental procedure.

J. E. WALLACE WALLIN.

CLEVELAND NORMAL TRAINING SCHOOL.

## SOCIETIES

### THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

THE Yale sessions of the Association on December 27, 28, and 29 last were more than ordinarily successful from first to last. Though regrets were heard that the philosophers had encamped far from the psychologists in Boston, nobody seemed to take it much to heart, for the attendance was fully up to the normal, if not above it. Considering the inevitable diversity of themes, the papers were admirably grouped, so as to permit those of a session being discussed together; this was particularly true of the second session and somewhat less so of the first. Partly because of this good management by the executive committee and partly by reason of the absence of other distracting scientific meetings, the general interchange of criticism and opinion became conspicuously full and lively; and yet the burden of responsibility for this stimulating outcome lay elsewhere. It was the sharpening of questions and the concentration upon two of these that told most. Of the fourteen papers read on Monday and Tuesday, seven may fairly be described as having focused, more or less clearly, upon methodology, in its widest sense. Three of these seven, three of the remaining other seven and the three leading papers on Wednesday morning pitted realist against idealist in a series of encounters lacking nothing of briskness. Most striking and singular—what, too, must have puzzled the laity who attended the sessions—was the invisibility of pragmatist badges and the almost unbroken silence on those topics pragmatic with which reading-room gossip has identified the new movement. Save in one or two addresses, which were explicitly historical or classificatory, not so much as the name appeared. In reality, though, it had vanished only from the surface of events; its “isms” had evaporated, along with looser first generalities from its nascent stage, but its spirit lived at a deeper level in the arguments of the realists. Their reiterated insistence upon the necessity of facing concrete situations and solving them on the basis of consciously accepted, definite, well-narrowed presuppositions was but the practising, rather than the preaching of pragmatism. This attitude

was particularly vigorous and determined in the discussions about methodology.

Mr. Charles Gray Shaw opened the meeting Monday afternoon with a paper on "Renunciation and the Ethics of Rigorism." Describing eudæmonism and rigorism as the two basic types of instinctive morality in the past history of conduct, Mr. Shaw pointed out the inaedquacy of each to explain the facts of behavior; ethics goes on without promise of pleasure or threat of pain, and against each theory violent reactions are repeatedly setting in, according to the times. There is a new tendency to-day to get beyond the old alternative of acquiescence and self-assertion; value and dignity are displacing rectitude and duty as ethical categories. But there is a genuine value in renunciation which must always be reckoned with. In comment Mr. W. H. Sheldon questioned Mr. Shaw's description of renunciation as an instinct, but suggested that courage might be an example supporting that interpretation.

An acute and lively analysis of the American situation, past and present, was Mr. Morris R. Cohen's "The Conception of Philosophy in Recent Discussion." The St. Louis movement marked an era of system-building; its end came with the founding of the *Philosophical Review* which represented criticism in the classic German sense of the term; the third epoch dawned with the JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, standing for the scientific handling of philosophical problems. Mr. Cohen declared this last school has solved no problems, but has only encouraged scientists to encroach upon philosophy. No other thinkers, however, have accomplished much more, because now academic courtesy and now timidity keeps them away from the special sciences. For the sake of culture, which is the supreme need of the American college, philosophers must make bold to sweep through the many fields of research and begin building systems anew. In doing this, they will perforce come to recognize their kinship with the artist and the literary essayist.

"Metaphysical Movements in Science," by Mr. James H. Hyslop, depicted the physicists' struggle toward a clear understanding of matter. The Greeks explained material actions by internal forces and so came to panpsychism. Newton, on the contrary, allowed matter no self-movement, but conceded to it the power of limiting the motion of other matter. Modern physics is now but a step removed from the Hellenic belief; chemistry professes to find compounds which induce actions without entering into the processes of the latter, while it is even claimed in some quarters that all chemisms must be induced by such an external stimulus. Ether is fast being vested with the attributes of orthodoxy's God; already omnipresent

and omnipotent, it may soon be counted omniscient. Contemporary physicists are talking old-school theology in a new speech.

Brother Chrysostom, speaking on "The Mathematical Habit in Philosophy," criticized the great historical exemplars of this attitude; as Descartes and Spinoza, so too Kant was mathematically minded, built on too few postulates, and worked these to the bitter end. These errors of procedure inhere in the mathematical habit, which, therefore, must be condemned for philosophical purposes. Mr. Herbert Martin presented a new way of interpreting the syllogism to students; it was said to prove advantageous in that it spared beginners the trouble of memorizing the traditional valid forms. In objection Mr. Royce declared that Mr. Martin's devices for reduction varied from case to case, so that the old difficulty of learning many applications was only shifted, not removed.

After this paper, the general discussion turned to Mr. Cohen's and Mr. Hyslop's addresses. Touching the former, Mr. Perry granted the propriety of speculation and system building, but insisted that this enterprise be held rigorously apart from scientific method. Mr. Ladd, referring to both papers, declared that there is no breach between science and philosophy.

A very large and alert audience heard the three papers of Tuesday morning, and the debate these aroused was the warmest and most prolonged of the entire meeting.

Mr. E. G. Spaulding set forth "The Logical Structure of Self-refuting Systems." His arguments the ear followed with difficulty because of their extreme condensation and intricacy; their main point was that neither phenomenalism nor absolutism can consistently locate itself in the world as described by itself—or, what is the same thing, either theory nullifies itself as soon as it applies its own conclusions to its own existence or to its own procedures. The development of this point carried Mr. Spaulding through the question about the internality or externality of relations and then through the kindred one about the infinite regress. By eliminating other possible interpretations, Mr. Spaulding reached the conclusion that relations are external to their terms; that the infinite regress can be truly given and conceived, not in a series of mental acts, but all at once by intention; and that only some kind of realism is not a self-refuting system. In the extensive criticism from the floor which ensued, Miss Calkins and Mr. Creighton led the idealists' attack, their most emphatic protest being that Mr. Spaulding had simply defined phenomenalism and absolutism to suit himself and then deduced their own destruction from them; genuine idealism, however, did not correspond at all to the picture Mr. Spaulding drew. Mr. Woodbridge and Mr. Pitkin, from the realistic side, centered

their objections about the speaker's apparent willingness to give relations position in space and so to make entities of them.

Its deductive methods assailed by Mr. Spaulding, idealism next heard its inductive reasoning no less severely arraigned by Mr. Ralph Barton Perry, in his discourse on "The Ego-centric Predicament." Mr. Perry's demonstration that the only inductive method, namely, that of agreement, which the idealist can use at all for his main thesis can not be used so as to prove anything drew fire from more quarters than any other single paper did. That experience determines its objects (symbolically, that  $(E)R^o(T)$  defines  $T$ ) is absolutely beyond proof, inasmuch as every investigation of the matter itself involves the constant presence of the experience-object relation. Mr. Lovejoy said that, however this might be, idealism might still find powerful support in the antinomies of space, especially in the fact that infinity can not be truly given in thought. Mr. Montague cited from Mr. Bradley a misuse of the ego-centric predicament. Mr. Creighton said that, so long as the ego is regarded as an item or a thing in the world, all realistic criticism of idealism misses fire; the ego is not a thing, but a principle. Miss Calkins found peculiar significance in the ubiquity of the subject-object relation; but Mr. Perry, replying, confessed that, to him, ubiquitous characteristics often seem the least important. Further comments, too long to quote here, were made by Mr. Woodbridge, Mr. Aikins, Mr. Hibben, Mr. Hume, and Mr. Pitkin.

Novel analogies were brought to light in Mr. W. E. Hocking's essay on "The Ontological Worth of Ideas and Feelings." Limiting himself to epistemology and to a finite knower, Mr. Hocking compared the independence of an object from thought with the independence of a sovereign from his subjects. The independence of the self is measured by the degree of externality of its objects. Ideas are to sensations as the state is to its natural data, such as its economic circumstances, its customs, institutions, etc. Like the state's laws, ideas confer freedom and individuality upon sensations. Sense *qualia* are nature, while ideas are at once an instrument of the self and of nature. Mr. Hocking developed also an interesting analogy between the tendency toward angularity of form away from roundness in organic evolution and the tendency toward discontinuity in the evolution of knowledge. He conceived sensation as the osmosis between the *Ding an sich* and the *ego*; this, he said, was Kant's own opinion. Idealism has its valid ontological argument; the object of knowledge finds its proof of existence in the very knowledge of it, inasmuch as the object, as idea, is forced upon the knower by nature. Logic itself is nature. Unfortunately, Mr. Hocking's hearers had battled so lustily over the two previous essays that they had no

strength left to discuss him as fully as he deserved. Mr. Urban pointed out the limitations of Mr. Hocking's political analogy.

The afternoon session began with Mr. C. A. Bennett's paper, "In what Sense can an Experience in Time be Timeless?" The speaker described various types of esthetic experience in which the sense of drag, succession, and anticipation goes lost.

Mr. W. P. Montague's "Mind and Life as Forms of Energy" outlined a hypothesis making consciousness potential energy and the *qualia* higher derivatives of the same. Ten analogies between conscious states and potential energy were indicated, among them the following: as potential energy accumulates when a moving body or force is redirected, so too does consciousness occur when the nervous impulse is turned down motor tracts; potential energy is not physically actual, nor is consciousness; neither has position in space; each has intensity; and each displays polarity (*e. g.*, the magnetic or electric positive-negative and the empirical subject-object relation). This hypothesis, if accepted, puts an end to the two great controversies, that between mechanism and vitalism, and that between parallelism and interactionism. Mr. Marvin doubted the wisdom of trying to advance by such analogies; only a physical theory which would clear up some difficulty in psychology, or a psychological theory doing as much for physics would be worth considering. In reply, Mr. Montague said that from the physical equations for potentials Weber's law may be deduced. Mr. Creighton objected to all such speculation on the ground that "potential energy" is a mere conceptual abstraction and so recognized by physicists; it is not a reality in any more than empirical sense. Mr. Woodbridge, on the other hand, was perplexed by the apparent implication that consciousness was somehow equally distributed throughout and between all objects "in" it or contributory to its eventuation, just as magnetic or gravitational stresses and pulls are exerted by all bodies in the system and somehow by the intervening ether.

Similar disapproval was shown toward Mr. Walter B. Pitkin's paper on "The Epistemological Dilemma of Biology in Reference to Space." The contention of this essay was that, in the light of the processes of reflex and voluntary imitation, biologists must accept space as more than empirically real and as the setting in which those problems arise to whose solving all organic evolution is supposed to contribute, provided biology is to use, as its fundamental categories of explanation, "agent," "environment," "adaptation," "selection," "heredity," and the like. Mr. Bakewell pronounced the account Mr. Pitkin gave of the idealistic space theory a caricature. Mr. Perry asked whether the criticisms founded on a study of the imitative reflex held against objective or absolute idealism;

to which the reply was made that, in strict logic, only the more than empirical reality of space was a necessary assumption, if any current biological category of explanation is to be used: whether some types of idealism are compatible with a theory of real space, is a question which may perhaps be answered affirmatively.

"The Generating Problem," the next topic, was handled by Mr. Karl Schmidt along lines continuing the development of his previous studies which look toward the building of "A Philosophical Platform." His endeavor was to depict the facts and doubts out of which philosophical inquiry properly arises.

Some impressive statistics were adduced by Mr. J. G. Hume in his practical address on "The Significance of Suicide," which demonstrated the need of revising the educational program in order to cope with the evil of self-destruction.

Tuesday evening in Lampson Hall, the President of the Association delivered his official address on "The Philosophical Aspects of Evolution." Mr. Hibben came out squarely against the "intellectual mysticism" of James and Bergson. After sketching the evolution of consciousness, the qualitative differences of function that accompany quantitative changes of organic structure, and the enormous gap which must always lie between reasoning mind and the next lower type, Mr. Hibben broached the question whether reason measures up to its self-set task of conceiving clearly the most intimate and elusive processes of life itself. In opposition to Bergson's thesis that change, the continuum and flux of events, can only be appreciated in an intuition higher than conceiving, he protested that ideas are not discontinuous, lifeless things, but rather organic, growing continua which take up fresh particulars indefinitely and transform themselves in adaptation to these latter. Intellect will never be displaced nor fail irretrievably in any problem—of biology or any other science—which can be formulated. A complete mathematical expression of life processes is theoretically possible, and, if never attained, then only because of purely technical or experimental obstacles.

Following this address was a smoker at the Yale Graduates' Club, where most of the philosophers joyfully forgot time, space, the absolute, and other office-hour worries.

Wednesday morning turned out to be a somewhat unpropitious time for the general discussion of time, inasmuch as many members, trying to serve two masters, left for the psychologists' convention before or during the debate. None of the three leading papers there read received fair attention from the floor. Mr. Arthur O. Lovejoy led off with an illuminating analysis of tendencies in Anglo-American philosophy with respect to the problem of time. He found two groups

whose members oppose each other, pair by pair, as follows: rationalism *versus* anti-intellectualism; eternalism *versus* temporalism; idealism *versus* realism; and "this-worldliness" *versus* pragmatic nominalism. The main issue is between eternalism and temporalism. Idealism is the refinement of the naïve man's eternalism, which he derives from the timelessness of truth, as truth. The strong point of radical empiricism is that real time resists conceptualization; while this is no positive disproof of the reality of time, it does argue successfully against intellectualism. Mr. F. J. E. Woodbridge said that the classical opinion about time, as typified by Kant and Royce, is suspected to-day largely because the ego as a world-knower is doubted. The absolutist view is taken from the vantage-point of Newtonian physics, which allowed the space concept to dominate the time concept; whereas now it is to the biologist and his categories of time that we turn for a profounder interpretation. Knowledge is accordingly looked upon as a natural event, with the finding of whose antecedents and consequences one should be wholly concerned. "How can experience give us knowledge of reality?" is an obsolete question, for knowledge has no reference to anything save its own antecedents and consequents, being not at all a representation of nature. Time is, therefore, not a mystery, but a perfectly natural peculiarity, to be naturally investigated. Mr. Josiah Royce, in a delightful anecdote, expressed his general agreement with Bergson and other defenders of real time, but at the same moment his belief that they have only elaborated the obvious and the indisputable. What they have altogether missed is that real novelty, which can never be perceived directly or described, is a supersensuous interpretation based on willed presuppositions about the world. The unique, the truly individual, can never be a datum of sense; hence the time series is a product of will, an artefact for the conceptualizing of reality. In the ensuing discussion of these three papers, Mr. Perry raised the question as to the imperceptibility of duration, and Mr. Lovejoy set forth his difficulties in the matter; but, owing to the dwindling audience and the lack of time for the business meeting of the Association, debate languished, much to the regret of the faithful few who tarried.

WALTER B. PITKIN.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.